The purpose of information systems (IS) security behavior, represented by the difference between work and personal purpose, has been neglected in the research of user's IS security behavior. This is especially important for the organizations that allow or inevitably allow their employees to do personal tasks during work hours, because it may bring big threats to an organization's IS. Unfortunately, few empirical studies have examined if different behavioral purpose, typically, work/personal purpose, affects users' IS security behavior decision. Based on boundary theory and the idea of multidimensional rationality, we argue that people demarcate a psychological boundary for work and personal usages of IS and thus apply different rationalities to make IS security-related decisions. Our empirical investigation indicates that in a work usage context, people apply rule-based rationality and therefore are more influenced by mandatoriness and facilitating conditions. Whereas in a personal usage context, people apply outcome-based rationality and therefore are more concerned with task benefits and costs. The findings imply that organizations and vendors may devise different measures to ensure users' IS security behavior in different contexts.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, researchers have continued to stress the human aspect of security issues in information systems (IS). Some studies have been conducted for work [1] - [4] and personal contexts [5] , [6] . These previous studies suggested that human errors can seriously threaten both organizational and personal IS. Some scholars further suggest that IS security faces more challenges than ever before due to the pervasive use of information technology (IT) for both work and personal purposes [6] . For example, it is difficult for many organizations to prevent employees from using computers for personal purposes, such as browsing social networking sites [7] , [8] , which could expose vulnerabilities of an organization's IS. According to a 2011 Ponemon Institute study, 63% of companies' IT staff believe that employees'
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Mansoor Ahmed. non-work-related computer usages in the workplace represent a serious threat to their organizations [9] . In a 2014 report, 40% of the surveyed employers in the US suffered from malware infections or IT disruptions that were caused by their staff visiting risky, non-work-related websites with companyissued hardware [10] . Compared to the problems in the workplace mentioned above, it is even more risky when people use personal computers at home to process work-related files. This is because hijacked personal computers are great breeding grounds for hackers and distributors and can lead to disclosure of commercial secrets [11] . Despite the importance of the issue, few companies implement effective measures to solve the problem.
Although previous research has proposed some theories to understand employees' (non)compliance with IS security policies (e.g., [1] , [2] , [4] ) and home users' IS security behavior (e.g., [5] , [6] ), there are still unanswered questions. First, previous research on the organization and home contexts has paid little attention to the fact that people may use the same computer for both work and personal purposes in the workplace and at home. Existing research has not distinguished the usage purpose when explaining IS security behavior. It is possible that different usage purpose (i.e., work vs. personal) leads to different explanations of IS security behavior. In some cases, users' security behaviors related to personal usage are beyond the scope of an organization's IS security policies. For example, an employee may voluntarily choose a weak password for his/her Facebook account; however, if the account is compromised, it may spread questionable materials or phishing links to other colleagues in the organization. In this case, the user's risky behavior (use of a weak password) may not be subject to the organization's policies and thus may not be explained by compliance theories.
Similarly, home user behavior studies might not be able to explain how users behave with a work purpose on personal computers in terms of IS security, since the work-related behavior should somewhat be restricted by organizational regulations. Second, it is unknown if users create a psychological boundary when they make IS security-related decisions with different usage purposes. Some researchers believe that due to the pervasive use of IT, the line between work and personal life is blurred [6] , [12] . For example, people may either use a work computer for personal usage during work hours or use a personal computer for work at home. The line seems blurred physically and temporally; however, we argue that the line may still exist in peoples' minds. According to boundary theory [13] - [15] , people create psychological boundaries to dictate the thinking patterns, behavior patterns, and emotions that are appropriate for a given situation [14] . The psychological boundaries between work and non-work are often manifested in the differing attitudes and behaviors that people exhibit in the two different domains [14] . Previous IS literature has discussed the work and non-work purposes of IT/IS in social media [16] and mobile phone use [17] , [18] . Unfortunately, existing research has not examined the role of usage purpose on users' IS security behavior. The possible existence of the psychological boundary between work and non-work usage of IS means that people may behave using one logic for work usage and another for personal usage. Third, by reviewing the IS security behavior literature, no comparative empirical studies were found that compared the influential factors for work usage and personal usage in different contexts.
To address the three gaps mentioned above, we conduct a comparative study to investigate users' IS security behavior decision-making patterns in work and personal usage contexts. Specifically, drawing on boundary theory, we argue that users demarcate a psychological boundary between work and personal usages, which may influence their IS security behavior decision patterns. Further, according to the idea of multidimensional rationality [19] , [20] , which argues that people apply different rationalities in different situations, we identify two types of rationalities in IS security behavior decision making and propose that users apply rule-based rationality in a work context and outcome-based rationality in a personal context. Using the multidimensional rationality of behavior as a conceptual framework, we built a model to compare the specific factors to reflect the differences in users' decision making for work and personal usage purposes. Last, we empirically tested our hypotheses.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND A. BOUNDARY THEORY
Boundary theory focuses on the ways in which people create, maintain, or change boundaries to simplify and order the environment [13] , [15] , [21] . People are prone to demarcate boundaries that are spatial, temporal, or psychological. Boundary theory views an individual as holding multiple identities (e.g., employee, home user) in different social domains wherein different rules, values, thought patterns, and behaviors are applied [13] , [15] . Individuals desire to behave in ways that are consistent with their identities [22] , [23] and are motivated to invest resources in those roles with which they identify strongly [24] . Lewin [25] first proposed that work and non-work are distinct domains that can be separated by a boundary. The boundary between one's work and personal life demarcates what belongs to each domain and establishes its distinctiveness [26] . Boundary theory has been applied to answer a wide variety of research questions, including those involving role transitions [13] , the interface between individual and organizational identity [27] , the impact of information and communications technology on work/life balance (e.g., [28] - [30] ), and playing online social networking games on a company-owned computer at home [31] .
IS research has indicated that the boundary effect exists when understanding users' IT/IS related behaviors. Typical examples are the distinction between pre-adoption and postadoption of IT, which indicates a temporal boundary of IT use [32] and IS security behaviors in different nations, which is a cultural boundary [33] . These studies have proven that people have different behavior patterns and reasons in different domains due to temporal, physical or psychological boundaries.
In the IS security behavior literature, researchers have also recognized some boundaries. Anderson and Agarwal [5] distinguished home users from organizational users by placeat home or in the workplace. Liang and Xue [6] identified home users by specifying the ownership of a computer, i.e., a personal computer user. However, place and ownership of devices may not be an accurate standard to distinguish work and non-work usages, as the boundary is often blurred. First, it is possible that an employee freely chooses where and when to work and is not subject to a certain physical or temporal boundary. For example, an employee may use a laptop for work purposes while traveling or address work-related emails while on vacation outside of the office. Second, an employee may use a work computer to engage in private matters, such as browsing Facebook or replying to personal emails during VOLUME 7, 2019 work hours. In this case, the employee plays a home user role psychologically and behaviorally regardless of the ownership of the computer. Therefore, we suggest that work or non-work usage purposes are a more reasonable criterion to divide the work/non-work boundary because people know the ''usage purpose''-for work or non-work. The transition of usage purpose may represent a role transition from a work role (as an employee) to a non-work role (as an ordinary user or home user). During these psychological role transitions, individuals mentally prepare themselves for taking on the role to which they are transitioning, and thus, they may need different thinking modes or behaviors to help them transition between work and non-work roles. Given the different usage contexts that may theoretically arise due to altered psychological boundaries between work and non-work, users must identify ways to accomplish their security tasks.
The IS security behavior literature has provided some initial evidence that users' behavior patterns are different when they are applied to work and non-work usage purposes. The differences are reflected in the formation of their attitude towards IS security (e.g., [1] , [5] , [34] - [36] , trade-off between benefits and costs [1] , [37] - [39] , protection motivation [2] , [5] , [6] , [40] , emotion [41] , [42] , and so forth. Previous literature has provided useful insight to understanding the work/non-work boundary effect on users, but prior studies have been conducted in a single domain, either work or non-work, lacking a theory to explain why people behave differently in different domains. Boundary theory provides a foundation for us to provide theoretical explanations of this issue.
B. RULE-BASED VS OUTCOME-BASED RATIONALITY
Rationality is a main focus of IS security behavior research. Rationality is a multidimensional concept and therefore, should be studied through its different dimensions [19] , [20] , [43] , [44] . Considering IS security behavior, two rationalities may be quite relevant in the users' decision-making process: rule-based rationality and outcome-based rationality. Rule-based rationality refers to the decision making that follows the logic of appropriateness, obligation, duty, and rules [19] . March [19] explains that individuals in a work context often take reasoned action by answering these three questions: ''What kind of a situation is this?'' ''What kind of a person am I?'' and ''What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this?'' Research concerning employees' compliance/violation of IS security policies in organizations found that employees' decisions are made by being cognizant of the rules in a situation. For example, these rules can be the specification of policies [45] or social norms [34] , [46] . In comparison, another decision logic is based on outcome. People could have a preference for a behavior outcome, which is associated with a cost or benefit of conducting an act [47] . In an IS security context, the outcome can refer to safety, rewards as a benefit of compliance, or a work impediment as a cost of compliance [1] . There could be a potential tension between the logic of following the rules and pursuing the outcome, because what is appropriate based on the outcome of a certain action may not necessarily be appropriate based on one's identity. However, transferring the boundary from one psychological domain to another allows people to change their rationality.
Although previous research has provided evidence that both rationalities (i.e., rule-based and outcome-based) may exist when people make decisions in terms of IS security, it is not clear yet which rationality is dominant in a specific situation. In this study, we propose that usage purpose can affect peoples' rationalities to make security-related behavior decisions. Specifically, we argue that when people conduct security behavior in a work context, they make decisions by a rule-based rationality, and, by contrast, when people conduct security behavior in a personal context, they make decisions by an outcome-based rationality. In a work context, people follow certain rules defined by the organization because of the social roles they play and their positions and responsibilities within the organization. Individuals' behavior, especially as it relates to work, is usually specified by standard operating procedures, professional standards, organizational norms, and institutional structures. People perform work-related tasks in a routine way in which they do what they are supposed to do. When people make decisions relating to work, they often find ''appropriate'' rules to follow. Therefore, when people decide to conduct security behavior related to work, they will determine if it is right or wrong, that is, if it is in accordance with the rules. By contrast, when people behave in a personal context, for example, to decide whether to use a strong password for Facebook, although there are suggested guidelines provided by the service provider, people do not have an obligation to follow them. Instead, more probably, people look at the outcomes of the act (e.g., safety as benefit, loss and memory effort as cost) and then decide whether it is a good choice to use a strong password. More precisely, outcome-based decision makers only consider if the outcome is good or bad, rather than if the behavior is right or wrong. Pee et al. [48] found that perceived consequences positively impact people's non-work-related computing.
III. HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH MODEL
To compare the differences in users' IS security decisionmaking processes in work and personal contexts, we built a research model, shown in Figure 1 . We use password behavior as the target security behavior, i.e., the use of a strong work password (USWP) and the use of a strong personal password (USPP). The reasons are the following: first, password use is an important security practice [49] , [50] and second, other than some security practices, such as IT maintenance, that should be done by IT professionals in an organization, users in both work and personal contexts can use strong passwords. Thus, it is a valid and appropriate security behavior for conducting a comparison. A work password is for work-related use, such as the password for logging into the company email or salary system. A personal password is private and non-work-related, such as the password for personal email, Internet banking, or personal instant messaging. According to boundary theory, work and personal contexts are psychologically different in peoples' minds; thus, we hypothesize that people may apply different logic when they make behavioral decisions. Specifically, we posit that people make rule-based decisions on the USWP, influenced by rule-relevant factors, such as mandatoriness and facilitating conditions. Comparatively, people make outcome-based decisions on the USPP, influenced by outcome-relevant factors, such as task benefit and cost.
A. MANDATORINESS
Boss et al. [45] have defined mandatoriness as the degree to which individuals perceive that compliance with existing security policies and procedures is compulsory or expected by organizational management. They argued that perceived mandatoriness is critical in understanding employees' compliance with IS security policies in an organization. The authors further suggested that individuals' perceived mandatoriness could be strengthened if the policies specify the desired behaviors and allow evaluation of an individual's compliance with specific behaviors. This indicates that perceived mandatoriness may have a stronger impact on people who conduct work-related computing than non-work-related computing because organizations usually have more detailed specifications of secure work-related computing and evaluate individuals accordingly. By contrast, non-work computing is relatively voluntary for individuals, in which individuals are less subject to managerial control, especially when his/her computing activities are not at all related to work, such as setting a weak password for Facebook. In this case, behavior is voluntary, which means an individual perceives himself as the origin of his behavior [51] . Hsu et al. [52] found that formal control could only influence employees' in-role security behaviors but could not influence their extra-role behaviors, which indicates a boundary effect on individuals' security behavior. The organizational mandatory mechanism as a restraint on user's behavior may not transfer to a personal context. Consider a user's decision of whether to use a strong password, perceived mandatoriness may be more influential for the USWP, compared to the USPP. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1: Perceived mandatoriness has a stronger positive impact on the USWP than on the USPP.
B. FACILITATING CONDITIONS
Facilitating conditions refer to the beliefs concerning the availability of resources to facilitate behavior [53] . An organization may provide employees IT support, and employees have the right to ask for assistance if they encounter security problems during their work. Facilitating conditions are usually available in the form of manual assistance by the organization's IT specialists or formal guidelines [54] - [56] ; therefore, facilitation of such resources also for rule-based thinking. People facing security-related difficulties regarding work have easier access to resources from the organization, which decreases people's barriers in performing security behavior. In comparison, such resources are not easy to obtain in a personal context. Organizations are not supposed to aid users in solving their difficulties in browsing entertainment video websites or to warn people to use a strong Facebook password. Instead, people usually obtain relevant guidelines online, which requires extra effort. Alternatively, people may seek help from friends or a for-pay service. However, such resources are either unprofessional or costly. Therefore, when people perform non-work-related computing, they may perceive limited facilitating conditions, which may be less helpful in solving security problems compared to those in a work situation. Ng and Rahim [36] found that facilitating conditions did not relate to home users' security behavior, indicating that facilitating conditions may have a stronger impact on work-related security behavior than non-workrelated security behavior. Considering the use of a strong password in our research context, we suggest that facilitating conditions may have a stronger impact on users in the USWP than in the USPP. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H2:Perceived facilitating conditions have a stronger positive impact on the USWP than on the USPP.
C. TASK BENEFIT AND TACK COST
While viewing the use of a strong password as an IS security task in this study, task benefit refers to the benefit or advantage of using a strong password, while task cost refers to the inconvenience or burden of using a strong password. Individuals usually evaluate the costs and benefits when they make IS security-related decisions [1] , [39] , [57] , [58] . Generally, perceived task benefit is a positive incentive to users' security-related actions, while perceived task cost is a negative incentive. We further argue that, for password use, the task cost/benefit considerations could be bounded in certain situations. In a work context, using a strong password is a common practice that does not require employees' considerable judgment on reasonability and feasibility. Rather, it integrates into the work routine as an employee's in-role responsibility. As a result, task benefit and cost may not be the key influential factors for the use of a work password. However, in a personal context, users are not bound by any formal responsibilities. They are in a voluntary environment and may more freely choose their passwords based on their preferences. In this sense, task benefit and cost evaluation could be more influential factors for users in the personal context. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H3:Perceived task benefit has a stronger positive impact on the USSP than on the USWP. H4:Perceived task cost has a stronger negative impact on the USSP than on the USWP.
IV. METHODOLOGY A. STUDY AND SAMPLE
We collected data to test our model through a paper-based survey. To compare the USWP and the USPP, we developed two versions of the questionnaire. We tested the questionnaires in two rounds of pilot studies with students and teachers at a university in Finland. We collected 34 samples for USWP and 35 samples for USPP during the first pilot test and 30 samples for USWP and 30 samples for USPP during the second round. We further revised the items based on the results and feedback of the two rounds of pilot studies.
For the main data collection, we mailed questionnaires to 1665 subjects who were randomly selected from the alumni list of a university in Finland. All of the subjects in this sample frame held at least a licentiate degree from the university and were employed. Specifically, 824 subjects received the USWP questionnaire, of which 217 responded, and 841 subjects received the USPP questionnaire, of which 207 responded. After eliminating some uncompleted and unusable responses, we retained 210 responses from the USWP group, with a response rate of 25.5%, and 202 responses from the USPP group, with a response rate of 24.0%. The demographic information was fairly consistent between the two samples (see Table 1 ).
To test the nonresponse bias, we followed the two post hoc strategies for estimating nonresponse error proposed by Sivo et al. [59] . First, we compared the demographic information of the respondents with the entire population on the alumni list. We found no significant differences in gender, age, or academic degree between the two samples. Then, we compared the results between the early and late respondents. We asked the participants to return the questionnaire within ten days of its receipt. We regarded surveys that had been returned within one week as early responses and the remainder as late responses. We found no significant differences in any variables between the two samples. The results indicated that there is no significant nonresponse bias in our study.
B. MEASURES
We used five formative items to measure the dependent variables-USWP and USPP. The survey asked respondents if their passwords met the standards of a strong password. Specifically, we asked if the password was not a word from a dictionary or someone's name, if it was at least eight characters long, if it used upper and lowercase letters, if it used at least one number, and if it used at least one symbol (e.g., '#', '^', ' * ', etc.). These standards are recommended by organizations such as Microsoft (Microsoft.com) and CNET (cnet.com).
For the independent variables, we drew from validated instruments where possible [60] . All independent variables were reflective. Specifically, facilitating conditions contain three items adapted from Thompson et al. [56] . Mandatoriness contains three items adapted from Boss et al. [45] . Task benefit, with three items, and task cost, with four items, were adapted from Bulgurcu et al. [1] . We modified all items to fit the current context. We used seven-point Likert scales, anchored with ''1 = strongly disagree'' and ''7 = strongly agree.'' We largely retained the same outline of the questions and only changed the concerning behavior (USWP or USPP) to guarantee that the questions measured exactly the same constructs in the two versions of the survey and that they also carried the same reliability and validity. Since we collected data in Finland, a person who had a degree in the Finnish language translated the questionnaires into Finnish. Several other Finnish native speakers double-checked the questionnaires to ensure the meanings of all items were preserved during translation. Appendix lists all questionnaire items.
V. RESULTS
We used the WarpPLS software (version 5.0) for model estimations. Partial Least Squares (PLS) employs a componentbased approach for model estimation. Compared to the covariance-based structural models, PLS is more flexible and thus is more appropriate for exploratory studies that have a goal of finding new theories or extending the current literature to new contexts [61] . Further, PLS can estimate both reflective and formative constructs [62] .
A. MEASUREMENT MODEL
For the reflective constructs, we assessed internal consistency and convergent validity by examining item loadings, Cronbach's α, composite reliability, and average variance extracted (AVE) [63] , as shown in Tables 2 and 3 . We compared the values with the commonly accepted guidelines. For reliability, the composite reliability of the constructs was greater than 0.8 [64] , and Cronbach's α was greater than 0.7 [62] . For convergent validity, indicator loadings exceeded 0.7 [62] , and the AVE for each construct exceeded 0.5. The exceptions were the first item of mandatoriness (MD1) and the third item of facilitating conditions (FC3) for the personal group, which fell below the 0.7 thresholds. We retained these two items for two reasons. First, according to Chin [62] , loading can be considered acceptable if the loadings of other items for the same construct were high. Second, the loading was still higher than the threshold of 0.4 recommended by some scholars [65] , [66] . Further, they were retained for sound theoretical reasons [65] . For the discriminant validity, all items were higher on their respective constructs than on the other constructs, and the cross-loading differences were much higher than the suggested threshold of 0.1 [63] (see Table 3 ). The square root of the AVE of each construct was higher than the inter-construct correlations [67] (see Table 4 ). The correlations among all constructs were well below the 0.90 thresholds, suggesting that all constructs were distinct from each other [68] . Internal consistency reliability does not apply to assess the reliabilities of formative dependent variables [69] , [70] .
To determine validity, we first referred the contents to the commonly accepted standards of strong passwords by wellknown websites (e.g., Microsoft, CNET). We also discussed the items with professors who are experts in information security research and have previous work experiences in the industry to ensure the contents of the formative items were meaningful and reasonable. To identify possible multicollinearity issues, we further tested the variance inflation factor (VIF) levels. The highest VIF was less than 2.3, which is below the 3.3 thresholds, suggesting that high multicollinearity was not present [71] . We also assessed the statistical significance of the outer weights. With bootstrapping of WarpPLS (with 500 samples), the results in Table 5 show that all the formative indicators are significant. Together the above results suggest good measurement properties for both the work and personal groups. 
B. COMMON METHOD VARIANCE
During the data collection, we used several measures to reduce the possibility of common method variance (CMV). Specifically, we used neutral wording for the items and multiple items for each construct. We ensured the anonymity of the respondents and requested that they answer as honestly as possible. For the collected data, we tested the CMV using two statistical approaches. First, we used Harman's onefactor test [72] and found that the majority of data variance could not be accounted for by one general factor; that is, the first factors of the work and personal samples explained only 24.9% and 28.2% of the total variance, respectively, suggesting no significant common method bias. Second, the correlation matrix (see Table 4 ) shows that all correlations were below 0.68, while CMV is evidenced by extremely high correlations (r > 0.90) [73] . These tests collectively provide evidence that CMV is not a serious problem for this study.
C. STRUCTURAL MODEL
We first tested the structural model for the work and personal samples separately. We performed a bootstrap resampling procedure (500 samples) with the sample sizes set equal to the work and personal sample sizes (N = 210 and N = 202, respectively). The results of the model with the two samples are shown in Figure 2 . Mandatoriness (path coefficient = 0.31, p < 0.001) and facilitating conditions (path coefficient = 0.17, p < 0.01) have a significant positive impact on the USWP. Task benefit (path coefficient = 0.27, p < 0.001) has a significant positive impact on the USPP, and task cost (path coefficient = −0.31, p < 0.001) has a significant negative impact on the USPP.
In terms of the control variables, we found that all four variables had no significant influence on the USWP, whereas gender, age, and computer experience significantly influenced the USPP. These findings are consistent with the adoption of IT in a personal context, suggesting that males, younger and more experienced users typically display higher levels of selfefficacy toward computers or the Internet [41] , [74] - [77] ; therefore, such users have a stronger ability to manage strong personal passwords.
D. MULTI-GROUP ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES ACROSS WORK AND PERSONAL GROUPS
To test our hypotheses, we performed an additional analysis to compare the path coefficients between the two samples. Specifically, we applied a one-way ANOVA to compare all the construct means first. In Table 6 , the results revealed significant differences in the use of strong passwords and mandatoriness between work and personal groups. Further, the results of Levene's test showed that the two factors exhibited different variances across the two groups. Due to the different variances in the dependent variable across the two groups, we used the Smith-Satterthwait (S-S) test with a pooled error term [62] . The S-S test can identify the differences between the same set of paths across groups. The empirical results supported all four hypotheses, which indicated that the two contexts indeed cause differences in the explanations for users' password behavior. Mandatoriness and facilitating conditions had significantly stronger impacts on the USWP than on the USPP, while task benefit and task cost had significantly stronger impacts on the USPP than on the USWP. Thus, H1, H2, H3, and H4 were all supported, see Table 7 . For the control variables, the impact of age exhibited a significant difference in behavior between the work and personal contexts.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS A. IMPLICATIONS
This study contributes to the IS security behavior literature in two ways. First, our work is among the first to use a contextspecific approach [78] to examine the context effect on IS security behaviors. Previous research only focused on a single context [5] , [6] or presented generic models that were free of context [79] . Such research could not reflect the differences between one context and another. By examining the different context-specific factors on password behavior in work and personal contexts, this study provides preliminary evidence that different models should be built for users' IS security behavior in different contexts. This study responds to the call for increased attention to developing context-sensitive theories [78] , [80] , [81] . Future researchers should focus on developing nuanced theories that can be applied to shape the IS security behavior in specific contexts.
Second, this work enhances the extant understandings of users' IS security behavior in both work and personal contexts by identifying two decision-making rationalities. Our findings suggest that in a work context when people perceive clear requirements (mandatoriness) and sufficient support (facilitating conditions), they are not personally concerned about the benefit and cost of a security action because people derive values from following rules rather than behavior outcomes. Although previous research indicates that both cost-benefit analysis [1] and specified security regulations [45] could influence employees' IS security behavior, representing different decision-making rationalities, no study has examined which rationality prevails in a work context. Our results reveal that people prioritize rule-based rationality over outcomebased rationality in a work context. For the findings in a personal context, our study is the first to empirically confirm that mandatory requirements are not suitable to regulate users' behavior in a personal context. This result is in accordance with previous investigations reporting that only 15% of home users believed that it was their responsibility to protect themselves from security threats; instead, 49% of the respondents believed it was the responsibility of big business [82] . We also found that facilitating conditions do not influence IS security behavior in a personal context, which is consistent with Ng and Rahim [36] . For the effect of task benefit and cost, contrary to the findings in a work context, we confirm that people prioritize outcome-based rationality over rule-based rationality in a personal context.
Our study also contributes to practice. Generally, our study highlights the need for awareness of the contextual differences in the management of IS security behavior. The prevention mechanism may not be as efficient as expected if the manager does not consider the context when developing a security policy. The practical implications of previous findings focusing on only one context are limited since users establish a psychological line between work and personal computing activities. The security problems in an employee's personal context can also be threats to the employer. Our results suggest that users' IS security behavior in work and personal contexts are influenced by different contextual fac-tors. Therefore, for the IT management in an organization, the IS security mission should extend beyond the work context. The countermeasures should consider context differences. For example, IS security training should cover the possible different prevention or precaution measures for both work and personal settings.
Specifically, our results provide specific suggestions to practitioners for managing users' IS security behavior, reflecting the context differences. For work-related security behavior, management should promote users' rule-based decisions by specifying the requirements with as much detail as possible and increase the material and manual resources to support the employees in the situation when they encounter problems and difficulties. For the personal-related security behavior, since users value the behavior outcomes more (i.e., benefit and cost), organizational practitioners or vendors of digital services can distribute additional IS security knowledge and inform users of the meaning of secure practices. Additionally, service vendors can improve the experience of security features so users could perceive more benefits, convenience, and ease in following the recommended security practices.
B. LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations in this study that should be noted. First, the measurement of the dependent variable is the use of a strong password. These data were self-reported instead of actual data values being collected. Although we provided respondents the criteria for a strong password, it is possible that respondents have judgment bias in their response. The consequence is that self-reported data are not as accurate as actual data. Second, although we provided the definitions of a work password and a personal password and allowed respondents to consider one of them when answering the questions, there are still a variety of options for them to choose in each group. For example, for a personal password, respondents could answer based on either their bank account password or email account password, which may have different complexities. With other answers unchanged, the reported behavior may vary. The situation may be less serious for a work password, but not absolutely. Future research could request more than one password and analyze the differences among them. The last limitation is that this comparative study does not examine all the possible contextual differences but attempts to show some examples to prove that the differences exist. Future research can examine other context differences.
VII. CONCLUSION
Drawing on boundary theory, the present study found the boundary effect on users' IS security behavior by examining the role of work and personal usage purposes when users make IS security-related decisions. We further found that users apply rule-based rationality when they conduct IS security behavior for work purposes and apply outcomebased rationality for personal purposes; therefore, the models for shaping users' IS security behavior are different. Our empirical results reveal significant differences in the factors that influence the security behavior of each group. This study represents an important step toward developing a contextual understanding of IS security behavior, which helps improve the usefulness of IS security theories. The results provide insights for organizations and service vendors to devise effective measures to enhance users' IS security behaviors.
APPENDIX MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT
See Table 8 .
